In this paper we investigate the impact of a voluntary corporate governance initiative on firm value in an emerging market context. We consider the corporate governance code introduced by the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 2002, applying to all listed firms on a "comply-orexplain" basis. We find that a one standard deviation increase in a firm-level code adoption index is related to a 10% increase in firm value in the period 2003-2005. Our results show that conclusions of empirical studies on voluntary code adoption in developed marketstypically finding no significant impact on firm value -cannot simply be extrapolated to emerging markets.
Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed a flurry of initiatives around the world to improve corporate governance. The European Corporate Governance Institute on it website provides texts of official corporate governance codes from 59 different countries, including 29 developing countries. Ideally, the adoption of a corporate governance code should make it easier for a firm to raise funds in debt and equity markets from outside investors, leading to a lower cost of capital and a higher value of the firm. The available empirical evidence on the relation between corporate governance code adoption and firm value is mixed at best. Studies by Alves and Mendes (2004) in Portugal, De Jong et al. (2005) in the Netherlands, Gilson and Milhaupt (2005) in Japan and Nowak, Rott and Mahr (2006) in Germany all indicate that voluntary corporate governance initiatives, relying on self-regulation, do not have an effect on firm value or stock prices. On the other hand, there is evidence of a positive relation between code adoption and firm value in the UK (McKnight et al., 2005) . In the UK the corporate governance code involves a mandatory annual compliance report for firms listed on the London Stock Exchange and the potential threat of litigation in case of non-compliance.
Hence, the empirical literature suggests that corporate governance codes require teeth to have a positive effect on firm value (De Jong et al., 2005) .
Empirical studies on the relation between corporate governance code adoption and firm value focus almost exclusively on developed markets. However, it is unlikely that conclusions from studies in developed markets can simply be extrapolated to emerging markets, due to large differences in the institutional setting, such as laws concerning the protection of investor rights and the effective enforcements of these laws (La Porta et al., 1998) . In this paper we aim to shed more light on the effect of voluntary corporate governance code adoption and firm value in emerging markets, by considering the case of The code closely follows standards of good governance introduced in other countries, such as the UK, and addresses the protection of minority shareholder rights, the importance of independent directors, board structure (accounting and remuneration committees) and disclosure of potential conflicts of interest.
The main research question that we pose is whether the degree of compliance with the good governance principles disclosed by firms is positively related to the value of the firm.
Evidence of a positive relation between code adoption and firm value is in itself not sufficient to conclude that the implementation of the corporate governance code leads to a higher market value. Another potential explanation is that firms with higher market values are more likely to adopt stricter governance. To shed more light on the issue of causality, we also investigate whether firms with higher adoption levels of the governance code had higher market values in the period just before the introduction of the code. A second question that we would like to answer is whether or not Thai firms choose their level of governance based on rational factors such as the need for external financing and expected growth opportunities.
To address this question we investigate which firm attributes explain the observed variation of code acceptance among Thai firms.
For our empirical study we use a large cross-section of 320 listed firms. In March 2003 the Stock Exchange of Thailand measured the implementation of the 15 principles of good governance in the Thai code by each of the 320 listed firms, based on the mandatory 2002 compliance statements. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the code adoption index is related to a 10% increase in average firm value (Tobin's Q) in the threeyear period after introduction of the code, while controlling for firm-specific factors and industry effects. The relation is highly significant and not present prior to the introduction of the code in 2001, suggesting a causal link from code adoption to firm value. Our results confirm the findings of the cross-country studies of Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005) , namely that in countries with a weak legal system the relation between firm value and corporate governance is positive and strong. La Porta et al. (1998) rate the efficiency of the judicial system in Thailand as 3.25 on scale from 0 to 10, far below the ratings typical for developed countries. Our results show that conclusions of empirical studies on voluntary code adoption and firm value in developed markets -typically finding no significant relation -cannot simply be extrapolated to an emerging market context.
With respect to the second research question, we find that differences in the implementation of the governance code among Thai firms are explained very poorly by firmspecific factors suggested by theory, such as the need for external finance, growth opportunities and asset tangibility. Ownership concentration has a significantly negative effect on a sub-index for shareholder rights and the presence of a written corporate governance policy, but the magnitude of the effect is small. Firm size has a small positive effect on code adoption, but most of the variation in code adoption among firms remains unexplained. The results suggest that Thai firms do not choose their governance to maximize firm value, in line with earlier findings in Korea by Black, Jang and Kim (2006b) . Our results support the hypothesis of Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) that firm characteristics should explain little of the variation in governance ratings in emerging markets. Doidge et al. (2004) argue that when financial development is poor, the incentives for firms to improve governance are low because external funds are expensive and the costs of adopting better governance mechanisms are relatively high. Note that if the previous hypothesis is true, the case for good governance initiatives by the government, or the exchange, in emerging markets is stronger than in developed markets.
Section 2 of this paper provides a review of the literature. Within the context of existing country-level studies of corporate governance and firm value in various countries, the contribution of our work is that we are the first to investigate the relation between the adoption of a voluntary corporate governance code and firm value in an emerging market with a relatively ineffective legal system. The conclusions of our study might be of interest for other developing countries considering the introduction of a corporate governance code. A second contribution of the paper is that we apply a parametric robust regression technique to mitigate the influence of the numerous outliers present in cross-sectional firm data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes the Thai corporate governance code, measures of code adoption and other firmlevel data. Section 4 in we search for firm-level factors that might explain differences in code adoption among firms. Section 5 presents the results of an empirical analysis of the relation between firm value, code adoption and various control variables. Finally, Section 6 concludes and summarizes the paper.
Literature Review

Global Evidence on the Value Relevance of Voluntary Corporate Governance Codes
In the United Kingdom the Cadbury Committee issued The Code of Best Practices in 1992, presenting recommendations on the structure and responsibilities of the corporate board of directors. The London Stock Exchange requires each listed company to publish a statement on the company's compliance with the Combined Code, a code based on the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee and others, including details and reasons in case of non-compliance ("comply or explain"). The auditor is required to review the company's statement of compliance before publication of the annual report (Piper and Jones, 1995) and there is a threat of litigation if firms do not comply with the guidelines (Dahya, McConnell and Travlos, 2002) . Dahya et al. 2002 report that management turnover at UK firms increased significantly after the issuance of the Cadbury Code, while the sensitivity of management turnover to negative corporate performance also increased. Dahya and McConnell (2005) In Spain a voluntary corporate governance code was introduced in 1998. Listed companies had to inform the Spanish Supervisory Agency about the extent of their compliance with the code. Fernández-Rodríguez, Gómez-Ansón and Cuervo-García (2004) show that the Spanish stock market reacted positively to firm announcements of (partial) compliance with the code in the period 1998-2000, based on an event study with a three-day event window. In Portugal a voluntary code of good governance practices was introduced in 1999. Monitoring of compliance is weak, consisting of annual surveys by the Portuguese market regulator with response rates as low as 54% (see Alves and Mendes, 2004) . Alves and Mendes (2004) do not find a strong relation between code adoption and stock market returns in Portugal, based on cross-sectional regressions in 1999 , 2000 . De Jong et al. (2005 study the good governance initiative launched in the Netherlands in 1999, which is based on voluntary code compliance and monitoring without enforcement. They find that the initiative had no effect on the corporate governance characteristics of Dutch listed firms and their relationship with firm value, measured by Tobin's Q. De Jong et al. (2005) argue that the failure of the good governance initiative is related to its voluntary nature and the absence of effective shareholder voting rights in the Netherlands.
In Germany a corporate governance code was introduced in 2002. German companies must disclose their past and planned future compliance with the code annually, without having to provide an explanation in case of non-compliance. Enforcement of the code is left to self-regulation and the capital markets. Nowak, Rott and Mahr (2006) Overall, the evidence on the effectiveness of voluntary corporate governance codes is mixed. However, the studies by Alves and Mendes (2004) in Portugal, De Jong et al. (2005) in the Netherlands, Gilson and Milhaupt (2005) in Japan and Nowak, Rott and Mahr (2006) in Germany seem to point in the same direction: weak corporate governance initiatives, relying on self-regulation, do not have an effect on firm value or stock market performance. Further, the reported positive effects of the Cadbury Code recommendations in the UK could be interpreted as evidence that governance codes require "teeth" to be effective. In the UK the "teeth" consist of a mandatory auditor review of the annual statement of compliance with the code and the potential threat of litigation in case on non-compliance.
Within the context of these existing studies, the contribution of our work is that we are the first to investigate the introduction of a voluntary corporate governance code -on a "comply or explain" basis -in an emerging stock market setting with large controlling shareholders and a relatively ineffective legal system. We are interested to test whether firms implementing the code have higher market values than non-adoptors, both before and after the introduction of the code. The conclusions of our study might be of interest for other emerging markets considering the introduction of a voluntary corporate governance code with a "comply-or-explain" requirement for listed firms.
Further evidence on the relation between governance and firm value
We now briefly review a number of relevant papers that study the relation between governance and firm value, but without the context of the introduction of a nationwide good governance code. Two widely cited papers in the literature, Klapper and Love (2004) 
Literature on firm-level characteristics and firm governance
A second question that we would like to answer is whether or not Thai firms choose their level of governance based on rational factors such as the need for external financing, expected growth opportunities and the tangibility of assets. In the cross-country study of Klapper and Love (2004) governance is positively related with firm size, sales growth (a proxy for growth opportunities) and the intangibility of assets. Durnev and Kim (2005) find that governance is positively related to growth opportunities, the external financing need of the firm and the concentration of cash flow rights (ownership concentration). Overall, both cross-country studies find that rational factors drive the governance choice of large firms. Black, Jang and Kim (2006b) study factors that predict governance practices in Korea, using a stock market wide cross-section of listed firms. In Korea regulatory factors are an important driver of governance, because Korean rules impose special governance requirements on large firms. Apart from firm size and industry effects, Black et al. (2006b) find that firm risk is positively related to governance, while other firm-specific factors do not have a large impact. Black et al. (2006b) conclude that many Korean firms do not choose their governance to maximize the share price.
An interesting puzzle is why differences in governance among Korean firms cannot be explained well by firm characteristics, as reported by Black et al. (2006b) , while the two cross-country studies do find a number of firm-level factors, based on theory, that are related to governance. Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) argue that when financial development is poor, the incentives to improve firm-level governance are low because outside finance is expensive and the adoption of better governance mechanisms is costly. Doidge et al. (2004) show that most of the variation in the CLSA governance scores used by Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005) can be explained by country effects, with limited additional explanatory power for firm-level characteristics. Further, Doidge et al. (2004) show that firm characteristics explain almost none of the variation in governance ratings in less developed countries. It is therefore interesting to test whether in Thailand corporate governance among a large cross-section of firms, both small and large, is unrelated to firm characteristics as argued by Doidge et al. (2004) and in line with the evidence from Korea. governance to firm value reported in the literature in our opinion diminishes concerns about "reverse causality" raised in earlier papers.
Empirical methodology and econometric issues
Influential observations are another empirical problem in studies of firm value and corporate governance, i.e. outliers in the data affecting estimation results and statistical inference. However, in contrast to the endogeneity issue, the impact of outliers on estimation results has received limited attention. Commonly used methods to reduce the influence of outliers are taking logarithms of non-negative variables and winsorizing at the 1% and 99% levels (see, e.g., Durnev and Kim, 2005, and Black, Love and Rachinsky, 2005) . Even though the firm-level data used in the literature often display strong non-normality, we are not aware of papers applying estimation techniques that are robust to departures from normality. 5 In this paper we apply a robust regression technique that explicitly deals with the problem, estimating a cross-sectional regression model with a skewed Student-t error distribution.
The Thai Corporate Governance Code and Firm-Level Data
In this section we describe the Thai corporate governance code, the measure of code adoption and other firm-level data. The collapse of the Thai Baht in July 1997 was the prelude to the Asian financial crisis, a string of violent currency adjustments, stock market crashes and economic meltdowns in the region. Alba, Claessens and Djankov (1998) argue that the deficient corporate governance and financing structure of Thai firms played a significant role, leading to inefficient investment, excessive corporate diversification and declines in profitability in the years prior to the crisis and a severe credit crunch afterwards. In the aftermath of the crisis the Thai government took several initiatives to improve corporate governance and disclosure standards, culminating in a good governance code for listed firms.
The Thai Corporate Governance Code
In The study gives listed companies a score for the implementation of each of the 15 principles, as well as an overall score, determined as a weighted average of the 15 sub-scores (see Table   1 for the weights). To distinguish various related principles of the good governance code, we have creates sub-indices for shareholder rights (CG Shareholders), board structure and independence (CG Board), formal corporate governance policy (CG Policy) and information disclosure (CG Disclosure). The first column of Table 1 indicates which subgroup each of the 15 principles is assigned to. 7 We calculate the sub-indices as weighted averages on a scale from 0 to 100, using the weights displayed in Table 1 
Firm-Level Data and Descriptive Statistics
The we could not find information in the Worldscope database, reducing the sample size to 320 listed firms. Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of the code adoption score, while Table 3 shows the definition and descriptive statistics of various firm-level variables used in our empirical analysis. To control for industry effects in governance, we assign companies according to the stock classification system of the SET to eight major industries and two special categories. i.e. in an ongoing restructuring process. 9 The group of MAI companies are traded on the Market for Alternative Investment, which has lower listing requirements than the main board.
We include firms listed on Rehabco or MAI in our study to cover the broadest sample of stocks possible. Potential differences in governance and firm value between companies in these two special groups and the remaining firms are not a source of concern, as they can be captured by industry dummies in the cross-sectional regression models.
Relation between Code Adoption and Firm Characteristics
Why do some firms choose to adopt nearly all good governance principles of the code, while others implement just a few? In this section we analyze firm characteristics that might explain the cross-sectional differences in code adoption among Thai listed firms. Before presenting the empirical results, we first discuss the firm attributes that we expect to affect corporate governance, based on the literature, along with the expected sign of the relation.
Firm Characteristics Expected to Affect Corporate Governance
The management and control of large firms is usually more complex, and therefore large firms might require more refined corporate governance (Black et al., 2006b) . Large companies also tend to be scrutinized more intensely by analysts and institutional investors, which might lead to increased pressure to adopt good governance policies. Hence, we expect a positive relation between firm size, e.g. measured by stock market capitalization, and the code adoption index.
Firms with high growth opportunities have an incentive to improve corporate governance to reduce the cost of financing additional investments with external funds (see, e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004) . We therefore expect a positive relation between measures of growth opportunities, such as the price-to-book ratio and Tobin's Q, and the code adoption score. Following Klapper and Love (2004) (2005), we measure external financing need as the difference between the firm's actual growth rate and the sustainable growth rate using only retained earnings and debt, while maintaining a constant debt-to-assets ratio.
An owner with a large block of cash flow rights usually has fewer incentives to divert company resources and might therefore be more willing to improve corporate governance (see, e.g. Durnev and Kim, 2005 and Black et al., 2006b) . In Thailand most companies are dominated by a small number of large shareholders, typically founding families and/or business groups. Further, the controlling owners are also frequently involved in the management of the firm. The corporate governance guidelines that focus on minority shareholder rights, independence of the board, information disclosure and conflicts of interest, reduce the influence and informational advantages of these large controlling shareholders. A negative relation between measures of ownership concentration and code adoption therefore seems plausible as well in an emerging market context with highly concentrated ownership.
When controlling shareholder increase their voting rights beyond their cash flow rights, e.g. through pyramid structures and cross-share holdings, firm performance and corporate governance are expected to deteriorate due to increased entrenchment (see Claessens et al. 2002, and Durnev and Kim, 2005) . Our data does not include information on the separation of voting and cash flow rights, but based on previous studies we do not expect this variable to be very relevant for Thai firms. Compared to other East Asian countries, the separation between cash flow rights and voting rights is relatively small in Thailand (see Khanthavit, Polsiri and Wiwattanakantang, 2003) . 10 Further, Wiwattanakantang (2001) finds that the separation of voting and cash flow rights has no significant effect on the value and financial performance of Thai firms. Klapper and Love (2004) hypothesize that minority shareholders can monitor firms with tangible assets more effectively than firms that rely heavily on intangible assets. Firms with high levels of intangible assets might therefore choose to adopt stricter corporate governance to compensate for the increased difficulty of monitoring by investors (Klapper and Love, 2004) . In the literature, tangible asset intensity is typically measured by the ratio of property, plant and equipment to sales (Klapper and Love, 2004) and R&D expenditure to sales (Durnev and Kim, 2005) . We use the ratio of property, plant and equipment to sales as a proxy for asset tangibility and expect a negative relation with the code adoption score. 
Parametric robust regression
The firm-level data include a substantial number of extreme observations -see the descriptive statistics in Table 3 . Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates can be very sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of a small number of influential observations. To explicitly deal with the non-normality of the data, we apply a parametric robust regression approach. We start with OLS estimation of (1) and test the normality of the residuals with a Jarque-Bera test. If the null hypothesis of normality can be rejected at the 5% level, we change the distribution of the regression error i ε to a skewed Student's t-distribution, defined by Fernández and Steel (1998): After estimating a regression model with a skewed t error distribution, the "normality" of the tails can be tested with the null hypothesis H 0 : 1/v = 0 versus H a : 1/v > 0.
Further, using H 0 : γ = 1 versus H a : γ ≠ 1, we can test whether the distribution is symmetric. If the distribution is skewed, but cannot reject normality of the tails, we change the error distribution to a skewed normal distribution and re-estimate the model.
14 If the distribution has fat tails, but cannot reject symmetry, we change the error distribution to a symmetric Student's t-distribution. Hence, after our nested sequence of tests, the regression error distribution is identified as either normal, skewed t, skewed normal or symmetric t.
Ideally, we would like the regression error distribution to take care of any nonnormality present in the data. However, we found in a number of extreme cases that the degrees of freedom parameter v converged to the lower bound of two, making further estimation impossible due to the non-existence of the variance of the error distribution (i.e.
variance approaching infinity). Winsorizing variables with heavy outliers is a necessary first step, in our experience, to make estimation feasible in such cases. We apply the following decision rule: if the sample kurtosis of a variable is in excess of 5, we winsorize it at 1% and 99% before including it as a dependent or independent variable in a regression. Turning our attention to the sub-index for shareholder rights, we find again that size has a positive and significant effect, but with limited impact. Ownership concentration has a significant negative effect on the shareholder rights sub-index, but with very small impact:
Estimation Results
changing Ownership from 0% to 100% is predicted to reduce the sub-index by only 5 points (on a scale of 100). Tobin's Q appears to be positively related to shareholder rights, however this relation is not robust to the exclusion of industry dummies and the impact is tiny. The The estimation results in Table 4 show that closely held firms are less likely to adopt written corporate government statements or policies. We estimate the economic significance of each explanatory variable in the probit model by multiplying the marginal effect of the variable by its standard deviation. Roughly, a one standard deviation increase in ownership concentration reduces the probability that a firm adopts a written corporate governance policy by 5%.
Discussion of the results
We find that voluntary adoption of the governance code is not driven strongly by firm attributes. Size has a significant positive effect on the overall code adoption score and the index for shareholder rights, as expected, but the impact is small. Ownership concentration has a significantly negative effect on the shareholder rights index and the presence of a written corporate governance policy, but again with small economic relevance. The sign of the Ownership coefficient is opposite to expectations based on traditional agency theory (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , which might indicate that some owners are reluctant to improve the rights of minority shareholders. Overall, the results suggest that most Thai firms do not choose their governance to maximize firm value, in line with findings reported by Black et al.
(2006b) in a study of a large sample of Korean firms. Further, our results support the hypothesis of Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) that firm characteristics should explain little of the variation in governance ratings in emerging markets. 
Relation between Firm Value and Code Adoption
Control Variables and Regression Model
Our primary measure for the value of the firm is Tobin's Q. As we would like to test if there We calculate the average of these three annual observations for firms with full data, and the average of the available years for firms with incomplete data. As Tobin's Q is positive by definition, we apply log transformation and denote the variable by ln(Q 03/05 ). To check the robustness of our results we also used the price-to-book ratio, ln(PB 03/05 ), and the price-to- denoted by Growth 00/02 as a proxy for growth opportunities and expect a positive relation with 15 In the price-to-book regression we exclude firms with a non-positive price-to-book ratio, apply log transformation, and winzorize at 1% and 99%. We take the logarithm of the price-to-sales ratio, but we do not to winsorize the series as the kurtosis is less than 5. As before, using a nested sequence of tests, the distribution of the regression error i ε is identified and estimated as either normal, skewed t, skewed normal or symmetric t.
Estimation Results
Table 5 displays the estimation results. A one standard deviation increase in the index of corporate governance code adoption is associated with a 10.4% increase in Tobin's Q on average. The estimated coefficient is highly significant, with p-value of 0.2%. We replace the overall code adoption score CG Total by the four sub-indices, to test which aspects of governance are most relevant for the value of the firm. The results show that CG Shareholders (shareholder rights) and CG Board (board structure and independence) are both significant, each with a positive impact on Tobin's Q of about 7%. When the sub-indices are considered separately the impact of CG Shareholders and CG Board increases to 10%, while CG Policy is significant with impact on Tobin's Q of 6.7%.
In the cross-sectional regressions with Tobin's Q as the dependent variable, the control variables Size, Leverage and ROA are significant with positive sign as expected, while Growth is insignificant. Further, the industry dummies are always significant (based on a Wald test) and therefore included in the regression model. As a robustness check, we have also used Price-to-Book and Price-to-Sales as measures of firm value (results not reported to save space). In the Price-to-Book regression the estimated coefficient of the overall code adoption score is positive and significant, with an impact on firm value of 9.0%. In the Price-to-Sales regression, the impact of the governance score on firm value is similar (9.1%), but not statistically significant at the 10% level. We conclude that the results are fairly robust to changes in the definition of firm value, as the estimated impact of governance on firm value is close to 10% for each of the three valuation measures considered.
Timeseries results and reverse causality
To summarize the results so far: we find a positive relation between the code adoption index 
where Y = {00, 01, 02, 03, 04, 05} denotes the year 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, respectively. 16, 17 Please not that we leave out Ownership as an explanatory variable in (4), as it is never significant in Table 5 We do not expect these small adjustments to the model to have a serious impact on the results, as the two-year growth variable is never significant in any of the regressions in Table 5 (with complete data).
we would interpret the absence of a relation between firm vale and CG score in the years prior to the introduction of the code, i.e. 2001 and 2000, as evidence against reverse causality.
The yearly regression results in Table 6 signal to investors that the firm's insiders will not expropriate assets and this signal affects share prices, not the stricter governance itself. As a final caveat, omitted variables, affecting both governance and firm value, might also be at work.
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance
We find a positive relation between the code adoption index and firm value in the period after annum (p-value 0.045). After correcting for systematic risk, i.e. beta relative to a broad stock market index, we find a difference in alphas of 10.2% per annum (p-value 0.161). Although the performance gap between the two portfolios is substantial, the difference in risk-adjusted returns is statistically insignificant, most likely due to the relatively short sample period of two-and-a-half years. We refer to Appendix A for more details, as well as information on the accounting performance (ROE and ROA) of the quintile portfolios. We find that firms in the highest CG quintile portfolio have significantly higher ROE than firms in the lowest quintile (median of 9.3% vs. 15.2%, p-value of 1.0%). Differences in median ROA are not significant.
Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the impact of a voluntary corporate governance initiative on firm value in an emerging market context with a relatively weak legal system. We consider the A contribution to existing knowledge of this paper is that it provides strong evidence of a positive relation between the adoption of a voluntary corporate governance code and firm value in an emerging market with a relatively ineffective legal system, based on a large crosssection of publicly traded companies. Previous studies on the adoption of voluntary corporate governance codes in a number of developed countries, e.g. Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and Japan, found no impact on firm value. We conclude that experience with corporate governance initiatives in developed markets cannot simply be extrapolated to emerging markets. Our results confirm the findings of cross-country studies by Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005) , namely that in countries with a weak legal system the relation between firm value and governance is positive.
A second research question that we address is whether the governance index is related to firm-level characteristics that are expected to drive code adoption, such as the need for external funds, firm size and growth opportunities. Apart from a weak positive impact of firm size, we find that differences in governance cannot be explained by these rational firm-level The results of our study could be of interest for other emerging markets considering the introduction of a corporate governance code. In contrast to developed markets, existing evidence suggests that firms in emerging markets do not have strong internal incentives to adopt good governance, such as securing external financing for growth opportunities. This seems to make the case for good governance initiatives by the government, or the exchange, in developing countries stronger than in developed countries. Laws that directly impose good governance standards on firms are one way to improve corporate governance. Our results suggest that introduction of a voluntary corporate governance code -with mandatory annual disclosure of compliance on a "comply-or-explain" basis -might provide firms in emerging markets with a market-based incentive to improve governance, as we find a strong positive relation between firm value and code compliance in the three-year period after introduction of the Thai code.
Appendix A. Firm Performance and Corporate Governance
We sort firms into five quintile portfolios based on the governance score in 2002. We measure the weekly total log-return of the portfolios in the out-of-sample period Table 7 shows the annualized average weekly log-return of the five CG sorted portfolios, as well the log-return of the SET index, a value-weighted index of all Thai stocks. 19 To estimate risk-adjusted returns, we regress the CG quintile portfolio returns on the returns of the SET index (alphas and betas reported in Table 7 ). The results show that stocks in the highest CG quintile portfolio outperformed stocks in the lowest CG quintile portfolio by 16.3% per annum (pvalue 0.045). After correcting for differences in systematic risk (i.e. market beta), we find a difference in alphas of 10.2% per annum (p-value 0.161). Although the performance gap between the two portfolios is substantial, the difference in alphas is statistically insignificant, most likely due to the relatively short sample period of two-and-a-half years. Table 7 also displays the accounting measures return on assets (ROA) and the return on equity (ROE) of the quintile portfolios, measured as an average over accounting years 2003, 2004 and 2005. 20 The difference in ROE is large and significant, e.g. a median ROE of 15.2% for firms with high CG scores (Q5) versus 9.2% for firms with low CG scores (Q1).
The results for ROA appear to be influenced by extreme outliers, as the difference in mean ROA between Q5 and Q1 is large and significant, while the difference in median ROA is much smaller and insignificant. We have tried to estimate cross-sectional regression models for ROE and ROA with firm-level control variables and industry dummies, but the variance of the skewed Student's t error distribution was unbounded (v ≤ 2) due to the presence of a large number of extreme outliers, even after winsorizing the dependent variables at 2.5% and 97.5%. Hence, given the small sample period and presence of extreme outliers in the ROE and ROA data, it is difficult to reach a definite conclusion on the relation between code adoption and subsequent firm performance, while controlling for other variables. All we can conclude at this point is that investors who shunned the portfolio of firms with low governance scores (after code adoption was published) managed to avoid firms with poor total stock returns and relatively low ROE during the following 30 month period.
18 For 14 of the 320 firms in our sample Datastream does not provide total stock return data. We expect no impact on the results, as the 14 firms with missing return data are evenly spread among the five CG quintile portfolios. 19 Daily total returns of the SET index were collected from the website of the Stock Exchange of Thailand. 20 For firms with incomplete data, e.g. due to a delisting, we calculate the average with the available observations (similar to the procedure used to calculate the average of Tobin 's Q in 2003-2005) . This table shows the estimation results of the cross-sectional regression of code adoption indices on firm-level characteristics, i.e. model (1). The column "Coef." shows the estimated coefficient (ML estimates, z-statistics in brackets). Coefficients in bold font are significant at the 10% level. The column "Impact" shows the expected change in the governance index (on a scale from 0 to 100) in response to a one standard deviation increase of the explanatory variable. The parameter γ is the estimated skewness parameter of a skewed t or skewed normal distribution. The parameter v is the estimated number of degrees of freedom of a Student's t-distribution, either skewed or symmetric. The type of error distribution used for the regression -based on a nested sequence of tests -is indicated in the last column. The row "Industry / Wald" indicates whether industry dummies were included as explanatory variables (Yes/No), and if included, it displays the Wald test statistic for the joint significance of the dummies. R 2 denotes the variance of fitted values over the variance of the dependent variable (displayed for descriptive purposes only) and "observations" denotes the number of firms with complete data included in the regression. This table shows the estimation results of the cross-sectional regression of code adoption indices on firm-level characteristics, i.e. model (1). The column "Coef." shows the estimated coefficient (ML estimates, z-statistics in brackets). Coefficients in bold font are significant at the 10% level. The column "Impact" shows the expected change in the governance index (on a scale from 0 to 100) in response to a one standard deviation increase of the explanatory variable. The parameter γ is the estimated skewness parameter of a skewed t or skewed normal distribution. The parameter v is the estimated number of degrees of freedom of a Student's t-distribution, either skewed or symmetric. The type of error distribution used for the regression -based on a nested sequence of tests -is indicated in the last column. The row "Industry / Wald" indicates whether industry dummies were included as explanatory variables (Yes/No), and if included, it displays the Wald test statistic for the joint significance of the dummies. R shows the estimated coefficient (ML-estimates, z-statistics in brackets). Coefficients in bold font are significant at the 10% level. The column "Impact" shows the expected change in the governance index (on a scale from 0 to 100) in response to a one standard deviation increase of the explanatory variable. The parameter γ is the estimated skewness parameter of a skewed t or skewed normal distribution. The parameter v is the estimated number of degrees of freedom of a Student's t-distribution, either skewed or symmetric. The type of error distribution used for the regression -based on a nested sequence of tests -is indicated in the last row. R 2 denotes the variance of fitted values over the variance of the dependent variable (displayed for descriptive purposes only) and "observations" denotes the number of firms with complete data included in the regression. Each regression includes industry dummies (jointly significant at the 10% level). 2002).. The column "Coef." shows the estimated coefficient (ML-estimates, z-statistics in brackets). Coefficients in bold font are significant at the 10% level. The column "Impact" shows the expected change in the governance index (on a scale from 0 to 100) in response to a one standard deviation increase of the explanatory variable. The parameter γ is the estimated skewness parameter of a skewed t or skewed normal distribution. The parameter v is the estimated number of degrees of freedom of a Student's t-distribution, either skewed or symmetric. The type of error distribution used for the regression -based on a nested sequence of tests -is indicated in the last row. R 2 denotes the variance of fitted values over the variance of the dependent variable (displayed for descriptive purposes only) and "observations" denotes the number of firms with complete data included in the regression. Each regression includes industry dummies (jointly significant at the 10% level).
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